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Homosexual Law Reform:
The Road of Enlightenment'
Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG 2
Justice of the High Court of Australia
THE JOURNEY TO ENLIGHTENMENT
This is the third time that I have addressed this Association. The first occurred in
1983. At that time consensual sexual conduct between adult males in New South
Wales (and in most parts of Australia) was completely illegal. After a number of
false starts, the New South Wales Parliament was at last moving towards
decriminalisation.
We should pause and reflect upon the determination of the reformers who
achieved an important, and belated, reform for the human rights of gay citizens. I
think of Bob Ellicott who pioneered the reform in Federal Parliament and John
Dowd and Neville Wran who successively introduced measures in the New South
Wales Parliament. It is important to remember that the cause of homosexual law
reform has always had champions who are not themselves gay. An important lesson
of my life has been to derive from discrimination against particular groups, the
general lesson of the need to avoid discrimination upon any irrational ground. To
discriminate against people on such a basis (whether it be race, skin colour, gender,
homosexual orientation, handicap, age, or any other indelible feature of humanity)
1 Text on which was based an address to the Sydney Gay and Lesbian Business Association, Sydney,
18 September 1995.
2 President of the International Commission of Jurists. At the time of the address, Justice Kirby was
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). The ICJ
has added sexual orientation to the list of future issues for human rights on its agenda.
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is not only irrational. It is immoral. The law should provide protection from and
redress against it.
In the past 15 years, the progress that has been made in achieving, through
legal reform, education and social movements, change in the attitude of Australians
towards gay men, lesbians and bi-sexuals has been remarkable, given the extremely
unpromising start. Sadly, the journey of enlightenment has been accompanied by a
less happy journey. At the moment of the achievement of important legal reforms,
the homosexual community of Australia, in company with brothers and sisters
around the world, was hit by a terrible endemic. So with the triumphs of legal
reform, greater community understanding and moves towards legal enlightenment
have come sad and painful times. Times of much suffering and of terrible anguish.
The achievements and the suffering have had a symbiotic relationship. They have
been interwoven through the lives of many people in this and other countries over
the past decade.
I defy anyone to read the book Holding the Man by Tim Conigrave without
feeling an appreciation of this mixed passage of passion, fulfilment and pain. It is a
book to cause anger about unacceptable discrimination and intolerable suffering.
But it is also a book of complete honesty and appreciation of self-worth of one
human being, struggling for enlightenment of himself and enrichment of the spirit
of others. I read the book when I was recently in the Solomon Islands in my first
session as President of the Court of Appeal of that country. It is a book for tears, I
am afraid. Its last pages are completely arresting. Yet, out of the pain, comes a
determination which everyone should feel to work for improvement. It is a book
that tells the story of the times in Australia.
Winston Churchill, invited to visit his old school Harrow, was called upon in
his advanced age to make a speech to the boys. He did so in three sentences. They
were: "Never give up. Never give up. Never give up."
This is the message for those who support the ongoing struggle for human
rights of all and the particular struggle for homosexual law reform in Australia.
UNITED NATIONS' INITIATIVES
One of my current appointments is as Special Representative of the Secretary
General for Human Rights in Cambodia. In that work, I am able to call upon my
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experience in the WHO Global Commission on AIDS. An important issue for
human rights today is the protection of people in every land from the burden of
HIV/AIDS. One of the few benefits which Cambodia derived from its isolation in
the decades before UNTAC was its substantial removal from immediate exposure
to the HIV epidemic. But now Cambodia, so close to Thailand and Burma, is on the
front line. It is therefore important for the protection of the right to life, the right to
health and the other human rights which the United Nations' Covenants guarantee,
that my work should defend human rights in the context of HIV/AIDS.
Unfortunately, Cambodia has not so far been blessed with politicians who see
the issues of AIDS with the clarity of Dr Neal Blewett and Dr Peter Baume. They
helped Australia to achieve a bi-partisan, courageous and generally successful
strategy to combat HIV/AIDS. In Cambodia, the Government and the Phnom Penh
Municipality are closing brothels and taking down signs promoting the use of
condoms. When I raise this basic issue of human rights in Cambodia, too many
men smile and too many women avert their eyes. Fortunately, the King of
Cambodia is an important ally in this particular struggle of human rights. King
Sihanouk wisely and clearly sees its human rights dimension.
On a broader front, the past couple of years have seen significant advances
within the United Nations to put the issue of sexual orientation where it should be
at the forefront of the issues of human rights in our world. The outcome of the
Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, has been described
as disappointing. This is because the final statement of the Conference did not
include an expected reference to sexual orientation and to the rights of women to
their sexuality, without discrimination.
But the issue was certainly on the agenda in Beijing. The demand for redress
against discrimination was given voice. Interventions reported how lesbians had
been expelled from villages and towns, for lesbianism is illegal in most African
countries. In some countries, it was reported, lesbians are burned, certified as
insane, locked up or stoned. In other countries they do not even officially exist.
3
According to news reports on the conference, the "battle lines" on this issue
were unremarkable. The United States, Australia, New Zealand, the European
Union, Jamaica, Chile, Slovenia and Macedonia, supported the call for action. So
did Cuba. South Africa, whose new constitution bans discrimination on the grounds
3 Sydney Morning Herald, 11 September 1995, p 8.
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of sexual orientation,4 was a new ally, important because throughout Africa there is
much discrimination on this ground. In opposition were the Vatican, Iran, Libya,
Morocco, Honduras, Guatemala, Ecuador, Algeria and Argentina, the last now a
hard-liner on this issue. It was only when the United Nations Secretariat intervened
that the committee organising the Non-Government Organisation forum outside
Beijing permitted a lesbian tent on the site. I applaud the adherence of the United
Nations Secretariat to basic principle and to defence of the principle of free
expression and persuasion.
The basic principle at stake has been recognised by the United Nations Human
Rights Conmmittee. It was recognised in the decision given on a complaint of an
Australian, Mr Nicholas Toonen, on the first day that the First Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights became available for
Australians. 5
I have to confess to being wrong so many times in my life. When Lionel
Murphy talked to me about his intention to bring the case in the International Court
of Justice against France concerning atmospheric nuclear testing, I urged caution. I
was wrong. When Rodney Croome and Nick Toonen talked to me of their proposed
action in the United Nations Human Rights Committee I also urged caution. I said
that I feared that a failure to exhaust domestic remedies would prohibit success. I
was wrong. Progress is so often made by people who take bold action. They risk
defeat in the name of causes greater than themselves. I honour such people. We
should all learn from them and emulate them.
The importance of the Toonen decision for the cause of the recognition of
sexual orientation as a fundamental ground for protection of human rights 6 extends
far beyond Tasmania, Australia, the occasion of the complaint. Ultimately,
Tasmania and its democratic Parliament would have removed the irrational law
which threatens to punish adult, consenting people for their conduct in fulfilment of
4 Cameron, E, "Sexual Orientation and the Constitution; A Test Case for Human Rights" (1993) 110
South African LI 450. Bronitt, S, "Legislation Comment: Protecting Sexual Privacy Under the
Criminal Law -Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth)" (1995) 19 Crim LJ222.
5 Nicholas Toonen and Australia, Communication to the Human Rights Committee of the United
Nations (Communication 488/1992). See (1994) 5 Public L Rev 72 and Note, A Funder, "The
Toonen Case" (1994) 5 Public L Rev 156; Morgan, W, "Sexuality and Human Rights" (1992) Aust
Yearbook Jntl Law 277.
6 Heinze, E, Sexual Orientation: A Human Right An Essay on International Human Rights Law,
Martinus Nijhoftf Dordrecht, 1995. See also Halley, J, "Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability" 46 Stanford L Rev 503 (1994);
Culverhouse, R and Lewis, C, "Homosexuality as a Suspect Class" 34 Sth Texas L Rev 205 (1993).
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their nature. The significance of the case will, rather, one day be found in countries,
such as Iran, where gay men and lesbians are still shot or stoned. The significance
of the decision is that it speaks to the whole world. It represents an important ruling
by a high body of the United Nations on a fundamental question of human rights. It
draws on the earlier jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. 7 It
spreads the enlightenment, sharing the progress which has been made in countries
such as Australia with other countries at an earlier stage on the journey of
enlightenment. We must be grateful to Nick Toonen and Rodney Croome for their
bold, imaginative and successful enterprise.
But we should also be grateful to the United Nations in its fiftieth year. With
its many faults and limitations, it is yet a vehicle for the protection of the human
rights of all humanity. Human rights were one of the three pillars upon which the
organisation was built in 1945. The initial meetings were held at the very moment
when the first revelations of the awful horrors of Hitler's concentration camps were
coming to the world's consciousness. We should never forget the many who died
and suffered for their sexual orientation, along with the Jews, the Gypsies, the
Communists, the Jehovah Witnesses and the other victims of the stereotyping
intolerance of the Nazis. Although the pink triangles disappeared with Auschwitz,
there remain many in our community who have not removed this badge of hatred
from their minds. It must be the role of education to offer them the gift of
understanding. It must be the function of the law to offer protection and redress to
their potential victims. It should be the role of laws and constitutions and of the
advancement of fundamental human rights to offer principled guidance to nations
and to the world.
CANADIAN FAILURE
The initiative of Nick Toonen and Rodney Croome from Australia had to call upon
an international statement of human rights. So far, the Australian Constitution has
not been thought to include a general provision protective of gay men, lesbians and
bi-sexuals from irrelevant discrimination. Interestingly, a provision appears in the
Constitution, not yet fully explored, which may one day be found to provide a
7 Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 149; and Norris v Republic of Ireland (1988) 13
EHRR 186. See also Modinos v Cyprus, 1993 decision of the same Court.
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principled protection against unreasonable discrimination in all unjustifiable forms,
including on the ground of sexual orientation. The section reads:
117. A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any
other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally
applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.
Of late, the High Court of Australia has found many important implied
guarantees in our Constitution.8 The writing of Lionel Murphy, when a Justice of
the High Court, suggests that there may be other implied rights to be discovered in
the sparse text by those who are willing to read between the lines of the
Constitution and to draw from it the fundamental principle derived from the just
nature of our form of society. 9
In other countries, not dissimilar to our own, express constitutional rights have,
in recent years, lately been invoked to protect homosexual citizens against wrongful
discrimination. Sometimes the cases have succeeded. Sometimes they have failed.
An example of failure, at least in the outcome of the case, was the appeal by
James Egan and John Nesbitt against the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Canada. 10 The facts were simple. Mr Egan and Mr Nesbitt were gay men who had
lived together since 1948. Their relationship was found by the courts to be marked
by commitment and interdependence, similar to that found in a marriage. When Mr
Egan became 65 years of age, in 1986 he received old age security. On reaching 60
years of age, Mr Nesbitt, his partner, applied for a spousal allowance. He would
have been entitled to that allowance had he been a female spouse. The relevant
provision in the Old Age Security Act defined a "spouse" to include:
a person of the opposite sex who is living with that person, having lived with that
person for at least one year, if the two persons have publicly represented
themselves as husband and wife.
The appellants brought an action in the Federal Court of Canada seeking a
declaration that the definition of "spouse" contravened the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. It was argued that it discriminated unconstitutionally on the
basis of sexual orientation. The couple sought a declaration that the definition
8 See, for example, Nationwide News Pty Limited v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 (HC Aust) implied
constitutional right to free speech; Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (HC Aust) implied
constitutional right to fair trial (per Deane and Gaudron JJ).
9 Sillery v The Queen (1981) 180 CLR 353 (HC Aust) implied limitation on cruel and unusual
punishments (per Murphy J at 362).
10 Egan & Nesbitt v The Queen, Supreme Court of Canada, 124 DLR (4th) 609.
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should be extended to include "partners in same-sex relationships otherwise akin to
a conjugal relationship". The trial division of the Federal Court dismissed the
action. The Federal Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, upheld that judgment.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, by a majority of five judges to four, the further
appeal was dismissed. It was held that the definition of "spouse" in the Act,
confined to opposite-sex relationships, was constitutional.
The principal majority judgment was given by Justice La Forest (with whom
Chief Justice Lamer and Justices Gonthier and Major agreed). Justice Sopinka took
much the same approach. The majority agreed that there was discrimination. But
they had to consider whether the distinction made by Parliament was relevant and
permissible under the Canadian Charter. They held that it was. They held that the
singling out of legally married and common law heterosexual couples as the
recipients of benefits was permissible. In the opinion of the majority, marriage had
"from time immemorial" been firmly grounded in Canada's legal traditions. It
reflected long standing philosophical and religious traditions. The ultimate reason
for it transcended all of these and was firmly anchored in the biological and social
realities that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate. Most
children are the product of their relationships. Children are generally cared for, and
nurtured by, those who live in such relationships. In that sense, the court held,
marriage was by its nature heterosexual. Parliament had wisely extended the
definition of "spouse" to common law relationships. But it was "wholly justified"
in doing so, and in treating homosexual couples differently. Although their
relationships could include a sexual aspect, it had nothing to do with the social
objectives for which Parliament had afforded a measure of economic support to
married couples who live in a common law relationship.
The four minority judges, Justices Cory, Iacobucci, Claire L'Heureux-Dub6
and Beverly McLachlin, disagreed. They found a clear denial of equal benefit of
the law. In addition to being denied an economic benefit, homosexual couples were
denied the opportunity to make a choice as to whether they wished to be publicly
recognised as a common law couple or not. Such denial deprived them of equal
benefit of the law guaranteed by the Canadian Charter. Just as the Charter
protected religious beliefs and practices, so too it should be recognised that sexual
orientation encompassed a "status" and "conduct" requiring protection. The
definition of "spouse" as confined to opposite sex relationships reinforced, in the
view of the minority, the stereotype that homosexuals cannot and do not form
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lasting, caring, mutually supportive and loving relationships with economic
interdependence in the same manner as heterosexual couples. In the view of the
minority judges, the appellants' relationship, dating back to 1948 no less, vividly
demonstrated the error of that approach. The discriminatory impact could not be
treated as trivial when the legislation reinforced prejudicial attitudes based upon
such faulty stereotypes.
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 appealed for a return to the fundamental purpose of
the Charter, namely, the protection of basic human dignity. Same-sex couples were
highly socially vulnerable in that they suffered considerable historical
disadvantage, stereotyping, marginalisation and stigmatisation. Such attitudes
derogated from the right of every Canadian to the personhood of each individual.
That right extended not only to homosexuals but also to the elderly and the poor.
Such stereotyping should not be tolerated in the social security laws of Canada.
There you see, in the debates of the Supreme Court of Canada, a reflection of
similar debates which we have had in Australia. Identical controversies exist in
many other lands.
UNITED STATES SUCCESS
Sometimes the Courts can uphold claims for basic sexual equality. In Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati Inc v City of Cincinnati11 the United States
District Court in Ohio had to consider a challenge to a law adopted following a
popular ballot known as "Issue 3". That law provided:
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact...
any ordinance ... rule or policy which provided that homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, entitles, or
otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment.
The proposition was adopted by the people of the city following a bitter
television, radio and other campaign. Sadly, the theme of homosexuals as
paedophiles was, in the words of the judge, "far from absent from the campaign".
We have seen a similar confusion, wilful or ignorant, in Australia in recent times.
The voters of Cincinnati approved the measure by a vote of approximately 62
11 850 F Supp 417 (1994) (US D Ct).
Michael Kirby: HOMOSEXUAL LAW REFORM
percent to 38 percent. The challengers objected that this measure was contrary to
both the 1st and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution. The 1st
Amendment guarantees free speech. The 14th Amendment guarantees equal
protection of the law to all persons in the United States.
The equal protection provision has lately come to be a source of redress against
impermissible discrimination. The issue of whether sexual orientation is within the
group of forbidden categories of discrimination has not yet been finally decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States. But Judge Spiegel, in the Cincinnati case,
had no doubt. He made the following factual findings in order to provide a
foundation for his legal decision:
1. Homosexuals comprise between 5 and 13% of the population.
2. Sexual orientation is a characteristic which exists separately and
independently from sexual conduct or behaviour.
3. Sexual orientation is a deeply rooted, complex combination of factors
including a predisposition towards affiliation, affection, or bonding with
members of the opposite and/or the same gender.
5. Sexual behaviour is not necessarily a good predictor of a person's sexual
orientation.
6. Gender non-conformity such as cross-dressing is not indicative of
homosexuality.
8. Sexual orientation is set in at a very early age 3 to 5 years and is not only
involuntary, but is unamenable to change.
9. Sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual's ability to perform,
contribute to, or participate in, society.
10. There is no meaningful difference between children raised by gays and
lesbians and those raised by heterosexuals. Similarly, children raised by gay
and lesbian parents are no more likely to be gay or lesbian than those children
raised by heterosexuals.
I. There is no correlation between homosexuality and paedophilia. Homo-
sexuality is not indicative of a tendency towards child molestation.
12. Homosexuality is not a mental illness.
13. Homosexuals have suffered a history of pervasive, irrational and invidious
discrimination in government and private employment, in political
organisation and in all facets of society in general, based on their sexual
orientation.
14. Pervasive private and institutional discrimination against gays, lesbians and
bisexuals often has a profound negative psychological impact on gays,
lesbians and bisexuals.
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15. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are an identifiable group based on their sexual
orientation and their shared history of discrimination based on that
characteristic.
16. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are often the target of violence by heterosexuals
due to their sexual orientation.
17. In at least certain crucial respects, gays, lesbians and bisexuals are relatively
politically powerless.
18. Coalition building plays a crucial role in a group's ability to obtain legislation
in its behalf. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals suffer a serious inability to form
coalitions with other groups in pursuit of favourable legislation.
19. No Federal laws prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Furthermore, voter back-lash around the country has lead to the repeal of
numerous laws prohibiting discrimination against gays, lesbians and
bisexuals. In 38 of the approximately 125 state and local communities where
some sort of measure prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
has been adopted, voter initiated referendums have been placed on the ballot
to repeal those gains. 34 of the 38 were approved.
20. The amount of resources spent by the City on processing and investigating
discrimination complaints by gays, lesbians and bisexuals is negligible. City
resources spent on processing and investigating all sexual orientation
discrimination complaints is negligible.
21. The inclusion of protection for homosexuals does not detract from the City's
ability to continue its protection of other groups covered by the City's anti-
discrimination provisions.
22. Amending the city charter is a far more onerous and resource-consuming task
than is lobbying the City Council or city administration for legislation; it
requires a city wide campaign and support of a majority of voters. City
Council requires a bare majority to enact or adopt legislation.
23. ERNSR campaign materials were riddled with unreliable data, irrational
misconceptions and insupportable misrepresentations about homosexuals.
On the footing of these findings, Judge Spiegel concluded:
that gays, lesbians and bisexuals have suffered a history of invidious
discrimination based on their sexual orientation. This is not a unique conclusion.
See High Tech Gays v Defense Indus Sec Clearance Office 895 F2d 563, 573 (9th
Cir 1990).
He held that gays, lesbians and bisexuals belonged to a category entitled to
constitutional protection. He therefore held that "Issue 3" was unconstitutional and
granted the order for a permanent injunction restraining the implementation and
enforcement of any law based upon "Issue 3".
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There have been many similar cases in the United States in recent times. The
Supreme Court of Colorado upheld a permanent injunction banning enforcement of
the State's anti-gay rights initiative in December 1994.12
Proceedings have been brought in Hawaii, along the lines of the Canadian
case, objecting to the refusal to issue marriage licences to same-sex couples. It was
suggested that such laws conflicted with the Hawaiian State constitutional
protection against discrimination based on gender. 
13
In February 1995, the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to review the
Colorado case. 14 It has since dismissed the State's appeal in a decision of profound
importance for equal treatment of homosexual and bi-sexual colleagues under the
law of the United States. 
15
The United States legal system appears to be moving inexorably to a
recognition that sexual orientation is, like race and gender, skin colour and other
aspects of nature, an immutable characteristic against which it is both irrational and
wrong to discriminate. However, as the Canadian decision shows, certainty in the
outcome of such litigation can never be assured.
CONCLUSION
The point of these remarks is simple. Progress towards enlightenment on the
removal of legal and social causes of discrimination against people on the grounds
of their sexual orientation has been made. It has been achieved with a growing
momentum in the decade past. Above all, there has been a shift in community
opinion, at least in countries such as Australia. This is all the more remarkable
because it has come about at the very time of HIV/AIDS. In a sense, the advent of
the pandemic has mobilised communities and galvanised individuals into a clear-
sighted perception of the need for resolute and determined action.
I do not intend to fall into the past error of believing that enough has been
achieved and that we should leave well alone. Or that there is a need for the pause
that refreshes or a time for consolidation. Injustices, and many of them, continue.
12 See "Colorado Pushing Gay Rights to High Court" (December 1994) ABA Journal 34.
13 Reported in The Economist, 1 July 1995, p 46 referring to Baehr v Lewin 852 P 2d 44 (Hawaii
1993).
14 Evans v Romer 882 P 2d 1335 (Colorado. 1994).
15 Romer v Evans 64 LW 4353 (1996) (US Sup Ct).
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They exist in the letter of laws which discriminate against people on the basis of
sexual orientation. The Canadian Old Age Security Act is but an illustration of
many such laws. Many of them exist in Australia. Many of them affect basic rights
such as superannuation and insurance. In the struggle against such injustices and in
the demand for equal treatment in the eye of the law, it is vital that citizens
committed to human rights gay and non-gay should, in Churchill's words,
"never give up".
No-one should ever accept utterances of discrimination or prejudice. I was
taught this at a conference of judges in Canada where a notable judge (Justice
Louise Arbor) said that she never accepted sexist comments whether from
witnesses, advocates or from her colleagues. Her lesson has instruction for all of us.
Whenever we see discrimination show its ugly face, we should write to protest. We
should raise our voices. It is only in this way that the unacceptable is revealed for
what it is. This is the way by which progress is achieved and enlightenment
eventually attained. Never give up.
The Changing Concept of Family:
The Significance of Recognition
and Protection*
Justice Alastair Nicholson, AO RFD
Chief Justice, Family Court of Australia
INTRODUCTION
Laws outlawing discrimination should serve as more than a source of enforceable
rights and protections; they should also provide a basis for shifting prejudicial
community attitudes. These only change when a society truly recognises the
humanity of the group who have been enduring discrimination and, to my mind,
nothing can be more central to a definition of humanity than respect for the
importance each of us places upon enduring relationships.
Equal opportunity law may and often does give a person access to important
individual remedies for certain forms of discrimination. Its importance should not
be understated. Irrespective of the number of complaints lodged, which may be
small for reasons that I will discuss, such laws have both an educative function so
far as the community at large is concerned and a deterrent function so far as
potential discriminators are concerned. For these reasons I support the introduction
of laws in this State prohibiting discrimination against persons on the ground of
sexual preference.
* A closing address to "Sexual Orientation and The Law", a seminar presented by the School of Law,
Murdoch University and the Law Society of Western Australia, 3 August 1996, Perth.
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However, it must also be recognised that such laws have limitations, as indeed
does any legislative intervention into the sensitive area of human relationships.
All too often, the anti-discrimination laws contain unsatisfactory compromise
provisions to appease the more conservative wings of the parties introducing them.
The laying of a complaint under them exposes the complainant to a process that
may be bewildering or embarrassing and, in some cases, expensive. In addition,
such laws contain no acknowledgment that gay men and lesbians possess and
express the most human of qualities - love and commitment through relationships.
I believe that, without the recognition of all family relationships, equality - the
cornerstone of democratic society is missing; public acknowledgment of private
affections, commitments, interdependencies and identities is denied.
For this seminar to pay attention to both family and anti-discrimination law is
also a sensible strategic choice. This is because arguments for the inclusion of
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination are likely to be met with
confused claims that doing so is a dangerous domino: that it will lead to the demise
of the so-called traditional family and the opening up of a Pandora's Box of
unintended and undesirable consequences.'
One of the most politically potent but patently false ideas is that the recognition
of lesbian and gay men's relationships will somehow encourage those who would
otherwise be heterosexual to opt instead for a same-sex relationship. To the degree
that sexuality is a fluid human characteristic, it strikes me as absurd to imagine that
the achievement of limited legal protections would induce someone to reorient their
sexuality. It seems to me that politicians take themselves far too seriously if they
really believe that any legislation they pass will have any effect, one way or the
other, upon this issue. All that such legislation will do, and this is reason enough
for it, is to provide that people whose sexual orientation is towards a same-sex
relationship will be treated equally with the rest of the community so far as the law
is concerned.
The victimisation studies cited in Anna Chapman's paper2 clearly show that
the introduction of law reforms is no solution in itself to prejudice, hostility and
violence against gay men and lesbians.
1 See the discussion of the recent changes to Victoria's Equal Opportunity Act in Morgan, W "Still in
the Closet: The Heterosexism of Equal Opportunity Law" (1996) 1:2 Critical Inquiries 119-146.
2 "Sexual Orientation and Australian Anti -Discrimination Law: Some Observations on Experiences
in the Eastern States", Paper presented at the Murdoch University Seminar "Sexual Orientation and
the Law", 3 August 1996.
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The argument about encouragement is closely related to the equally misguided
belief that homosexuals are prone to attempt to "corrupt" children. As noted by
both June Williams 3 and Anna Chapman, 4 this myth is an unfortunate feature of the
anti-discrimination statutes of some other States and appears particularly strongly in
the preamble to the 1989 Western Australian Act, which decriminalised male
homosexual acts between adults over a certain age.
5
There is a tendency to confuse homosexuality with paedophilia. Such a
stereotype reflects the inability or refusal of some people to understand that the
exploitation, harassment and assault of children and young people is a harm related
to sexuality as such, without regard to sexual preference and in most instances, but
not all, to masculinity. The important point is that there is no evidence to support
the proposition that it bears any relationship to homosexuality whatsoever: "Most
perpetrators of child abuse identify as heterosexual men and their victims are
predominantly female." 6 It is therefore plainly spurious to confuse calls for law
reform with concern about the propensity of some to abuse their power and trust.
This was an illogical and unsavoury feature of some of the opposition' to the recent
"lawful sexual behaviour" amendment to Victoria's Equal Opportunity Act, and
one which I hope will not be repeated by Western Australian parliamentarians or
the media.
What must be properly understood is that the real effect of refusing to
acknowledge and provide protections to same-sex relationships is to fail to
recognise anything else but relationships and the meanings they give to an
individual's life. This current state of the law smacks of society punishing
otherwise law-abiding members for a sexual orientation that is, in and of itself,
lawful.
And to what gain? Legal denial and intolerance achieve nothing but an insult to
the dignity of recognition that every family treasures and has the right to expect in a
3 "Western Australian Anti -Discrimination Law and Proposals for Change", Paper presented at the
Murdoch University Seminar "Sexual Orientation and the Law", 3 August 1996.
4 See note 2.
5 See the preamble to the Law Reform (Decriminalisation of Sodomy) Act 1989 (WA) which includes
"AND WHEREAS, in particular the Parliament disapproves of persons with care supervision or
authority over young persons urging them to adopt homosexuality as a lifestyle and disapproves of
instrumentalities of the State so doing..."
6 Morgan, W and Walker, K "Rejecting (ln)tolerance: Tolerance and Homosex" (1995) 20:1
Melbourne University Law Review 214.
7 Morgan op cit; Stewart, M "Equal Opportunity Except for you... and you... and you" (1996) 20:4
Alternative Law Journal 196-197.
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country which supposedly supports tolerance for peaceful differences among its
members.
To continue to ignore the rights of same-sex individuals and their relationships
is a pyrrhic achievement of which no government ought to be proud. Denying
someone the right to be known as a committed partner to a relationship, simply on
the basis of the gender of the partners, is no different to apartheid. Writing of the
resistance to same-sex relationships in American society, Herma Hill Kay,
Professor of Law at the University of California Berkeley made an observation that
applies equally here:
Just as the existence of racially mixed families once challenged the legitimacy of
white supremacy in ways that strengthened the social fabric in the United States,
so may the contemporary example of stable same-sex families ultimately lead to a
richer and more diverse social and cultural life. 8
I am in my position as the Chief Justice of the Family Court because I value
positive consensual relationships. As a barrister, Supreme Court Judge and Chief
Justice of the Family Court of Australia, the vast majority of harms seen in my
work have arisen from violence, abuses of power and broken commitments and not
to the fact that some people prefer same-sex relationships. To value and respect
those who wish to stand connected to each other and accountable to each other in
the face of intolerance, is a cause that deserves support.
I hold the position also because I value human rights and the principle of equal
treatment. These are precious bulwarks against vulnerability and oppression, and it
is almost axiomatic that the clearest perception of the need for these rights comes
from those who lack them.
The catch cry that is often heard, as it is with Aboriginal and even feminist
groups, that lesbians and gay men are seeking "special rights" has no foundation. It
is simply a case of the law having failed to provide the equal protection to which
they are entitled by virtue of their essential humanity. As I understand the proposals
for change under consideration in this State, none bear any resemblance to the
somewhat charged legal concept of affirmative action. The calls for law reform are
to end the current harms caused by inequality and the refusal to aclnowledge that
gay men and lesbians have and do lead family lives that should not be denigrated
by legal invisibility.
8 Kay, HH "Private Choices and Public Policy" (1991) 5:1 Australian Journal of Family Law 84.
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To my mind, anyone who stands by the values of commitment, relationships
and equal protection should support legislative measures that outlaw discrimination
and recognise same-sex relationships. Otherwise, they are shareholders in unwar-
ranted fear and prejudice, a stock that, unfortunately, is held dear by too many in
this country. Inevitably, some of our politicians reflect these feelings, but I find it
hard to believe that a majority of them do so, when and if they are confronted with
the overwhelming logic of the contrary position.
I have a little relevant experience in the controversy that attends these matters.
In fact I suspect that the organisers thought to ask me because of comments I made
on the value of recognising same-sex relationships, remarks which attracted
substantial media attention in early 1995. I therefore thought that it might be of
interest to briefly recall that episode because it contained some lessons which may
be instructive.
MY ADDRESS TO ST MARK'S THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE
Two years ago in Canberra in September 1994, I was invited to address the St
Mark's Theological Centre on the topic of "Perceptions of the Australian Family".
9
In my address, I was critical of the "sterile debate" that had taken place in the
International Year of the Family over what constituted a family and the lack of
practical measures to aid those families most in need. In the course of my paper, I
drew attention to the economic plight of mothers without partners and the increased
suffering of a generation of children arising from what I see as the preoccupation of
governments with economic rationalism.
On the night I delivered the speech, I had no reason to believe that it had been
a particularly controversial address, let alone radical or revolutionary. I therefore
found it surprising to receive a telephone call in late December from a journalist
who, I assume, had seen of a copy of the printed speech when it appeared in the
Theological Centre's journal.
I do not know what she thought might have occurred in the few months since
making the speech, but she asked me whether I still stood by a particular sentence
in that address that our understanding of family, and I quote:
9 (1995)St Mark's Review, No 160, pp 11-16.
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may, in my belief, extend to people living in permanent homosexual as well as
heterosexual relationships and I think it more than time that we and the law
recognised this. 10
Needless to say, I told her that I did stand by that view, and woke up on 3 January
to find that the front page of the Sydney Morning Herald was ablaze with the
headline "Judge: give gay couples equality".
Now, as many of you may know, the Christmas and New Year period is the
slow time for news, and attention to my comments served both the interests of the
media industry and those who opposed my view. What followed bore little
resemblance to what I had said about the undesirability of setting rigid limits on
what a family can be, and it was an interesting circus for a number of reasons.
THE MEDIA TREATMENT
First, it seems to me that the media were preoccupied with the sensation of a Chief
Justice speaking about same-sex relationships despite the fact that it was not a
central feature of my speech. 11 The media's agenda, I think, was to generate
conflict which they could then report. Little room was left for me to describe the
context of those remarks, which was my continuing concern that there are various
types of deeply felt relationships which, despite their importance, still lack legal
recognition.
The concerns that I addressed in that speech were not limited to same-sex
couples. I also addressed the still unresolved problem of the fragmented laws
relating to heterosexual couples living in de facto relationships. Also, shortly before
giving the St Mark's address, I had just returned from visiting Torres Strait Islander
communities as part of the court's on-going commitment to improve the relevance
and accessibility of its services to remote areas. I was particularly interested during
these community consultations by the traditional adoption practices of the Islander
peoples, examples of this being brothers giving a child to a childless sister and both
child and sister accepting full parent-child relationships. 12
10 (1995) StMark's Review, No 160, p 12.
11 See the letter by Mr Len Glare, Chief Executive Officer of the Family Court of Australia in Sydney
Morning Herald, 7 February 1995.
12 See Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report
No 31, Canberra, AGPS, 1986; Nicholson, A "Indigenous Customary Law and Australian Family
Law" (1995) 42 Family Matters 24-29.
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It was telling that in my subsequent interviews, when I tried to explain the
problem of these relationships remaining unrecognised by law and that de facto
heterosexual families still face unnecessary inequalities, journalists were more pre-
occupied with how I felt about the adverse reaction to my suggestion about
recognising same-sex relationships. There was little interest in teasing out the
significance of denying legal status, not only for the adults involved, but for the
children in these families.
THE REACTION To MY COMMENTS
The public reaction to my comments was also instructive. Both the Federal Labour
and Liberal parties were rather quiet on the subject but interestingly, the Young
Liberals appeared to adopt a supportive stance. 13 One of the most unusual
responses from a politician was that my remarks reflected "narrow cast but very
trendy beliefs"' 14 - a rather unusual claim to fame for a Judge! They were also
considered "an attack on the institution of the family" and a step towards a "non-
reproductive society" which had to be fought "tooth and nail".'5
Fortunately, the then Attorney-General and Minister for Health in the
Australian Capital Territory was able to reassure the public that this fear was
unfounded. Mr Terry Connolly said that the passing of the Territory's Domestic
Relationships Act, according equivalent treatment of property settlement to same-
sex couples, had not had any effect on birth rates in Canberra; "On the contrary",
he said, "we recently opened our third Maternity unit". 
16
The Australian newspaper's editorial said that my suggestion was
"unrealistic", 17 and its columnist, BA Santamaria, wrote that my remarks
illustrated:
the well-known phenomenon of the "slippery slope". Once one foundational
principle [and by this Mr Santamaria meant "family"] is compromised, it becomes
only too easy to compromise the next. No firm ground is left on which to stand. 
18
13 "Young Libs in pro-gay move", Sydney Morning Herald, 6 January 1995;
14 National Party leader, Mr Tim Fischer, Canberra Times, 6 January 1995.
15 National Party leader, Mr Tim Fischer, Australian, 5 January 1995.
16 Canberra Times, 6 January 1995.
17 Weekend Australian, 7-8 January 1995.
18 Weekend Australian, 14-15 January 1995.
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When I look back on the media treatment of the issue at the time I made my
comments, it strikes me that the push down the "slippery slope" mentioned by
Mr Santamaria was coming from opponents to law reform. The suggestion that
relationships be recognised was transformed by some into a warning against the
redefinition of marriage.' 9 Such a connection was not mentioned in my remarks
nor, as I recall, by those who spoke on behalf of the lesbian and gay community.
The slope itself must be a fairly gentle one since the slide seems to have been well
under way in Athens in 400 BC.
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
I do not find the lack of comment on the question of marriage from lesbian and gay
commentators surprising. First, despite the claims of those who would see the
redefinition of marriage as the ultimate goal, I am conscious that there are wide-
ranging views on this issue within the lesbian and gay community, including those
who are staunchly opposed to extending the institution of marriage.
For example, at the First World Congress on Family Law and Children's
Rights held in Sydney during 1993, Hayley Katzen delivered a paper on the legal
recognition of lesbian and gay men's relationships which suggested to me that
access to "marriage" was not a common goal, at least within the Sydney
community. 20 Rather, the principal concern was recognition of their relationships
and an end to the social, legal and economic disadvantages which accompany
having a same-sex partner.
Secondly, I would venture to suggest that advocates for reform are conscious
that to speak of same-sex marriages "ups" the symbolic ante. Those opposed to the
concept of same-sex relationships are very aware of the currency of drawing the
link with marriage and in some cases may do so as a deliberate tactic to stifle more
modest law reform. Other opponents may be conscious that there have been recent
attempts to redefine the meaning of marriage in other countries with a similar legal
19 Mercury, 6 January 1995.
20 Katzen, H "The Bride Wore Pink Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships" (1993) 3
Australasian Gay and Lesbian LJ 67.
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tradition to that of Australia, such as the United States,21 Canada22 and New
Zealand, 2 and may assume that such an agenda is at play locally too.
It therefore seems to me that lobbyists for reform need to plan their approach
with a recognition that these overseas challenges do impact upon the perceptions of
Australians and that whatever the pros or cons of the issue, the concept of
"marriage" carries a meaning which is powerfully infused with tradition, history
and religion, even more so than the concept of "family".
I think that it must also be remembered that marriage carries with it strong
religious connotations for many people and that the law of marriage itself is directly
descended from concepts developed originally within the Eastern and Western
branches of the ancient Catholic Church and latterly, so far as this country is
concerned, by the Ecclesiastical Courts in England, applying the dogma of the
Church of England.
It is true that as a matter of law it is now a secular institution, but it is rarely
treated as such by the public or by legislators.
The recent Parliamentary Select Committee on Family Law, which recom-
mended the legal recognition of de facto relationships, was careful to say that this
should not be achieved by the simple recognition of such relationships in the
Family Law Act 1975, but rather by enacting separate legislation which would not
afford to de facto heterosexual partners the same recognition as would be given to
parties to a marriage.
It is instructive to observe how far behind this country is on issues such as this
when compared to Canada with its Charter. In this country, a Bill of Rights is
anathema to most conservative lawyers and politicians and quite a few on the Labor
side of politics.
It may therefore be helpful for law reform advocates to repeatedly make it clear
that a change to the recognition of same-sex relationships in Western Australia will
have no effect on the definition of marriage because this is a matter of
21 Baehr v Lewin (1993) 74 Haw 539.
22 Layland v Ontario (1993) 104 DLR (44th) 214.
23 Quilter and Pearl v Attorney- General (sued in respect of) Registrar General oBirths Deaths and
Marriages (unreported, HC NZ, Auckland, Kerr J, 28 May 1996).
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Commonwealth law.2 4 While this may seem obvious to this audience, I think that
the issues can easily merge and blur for the public.
As my small experience in this matter has shown me, the media have an
important role to play in keeping the issues clear and I think there is a good deal of
benefit that comes from explaining to journalists and to politicians what is not
within the ambit of the reforms they propose.
THE CORRESPONDENCE
The hostile correspondence after my comments hit the press were a troubling
indication of the misunderstanding, fear and frank prejudice that lies in the
community. Some of the letters to my chambers were rather vitriolic. Writers
speculated on my underlying personal motives, quite often providing me with
extensive quotations from the Scriptures.
Some who wrote to me called for my impeachment and this made for a touch
of irony, because at least one newspaper columnist had suggested that my stance
was part of a supposed bid to be appointed to fill a vacancy on the High Court.
2 5
The logical link escaped me then as it does now, when one considers the position of
the government at that time on the Tasmanian criminal law against consenting sex
between adult men.
In contrast, the letters from those who supported my stance were often very
moving. What touched me particularly were the encouraging sentiments of the
parents and friends of gay men and lesbians, people who are too often forgotten in
the furore of debate. They explained the damaging consequences of a lack of
societal respect for their children, and told of how social and legal blindness to their
children's relationships placed stress upon the entire extended family. It left me
wondering whether any of the protagonists had really stopped to think that lesbians
and gay men were part of a wider family context and I, as a parent, was left
24 See Lauw, I "Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Time for Change?" (1994) 1:3 E Law Murdoch
University Electronic Journal of Law. As to an attempt to reinterpret the meaning of the words
"husband" and "wife" to incorporate same-sex partners see Re Brown and Commissioner for
Superannuation (1995) 38 ALD 344 where the Administrative Appeals Tribunal said it gave them
"no joy" to find that the surviving partner to a homosexual relationship was not entitled to a spouse
benefit under the Superannuation Act 1976 (Cth).
25 McGuiness, PP "Justice Needs a Public Airing", Sydney Morning Herald, 27 January 1995.
Alastair Nicholson- CHANGING CONCEPT OF FAMILY
wondering how I would feel if my grown-up children were talked about in the
tones of derision that crossed my desk in the newspapers and letters.
One letter that I particularly recall came from an adult man brought up by his
mother and her long-term female partner. His letter spoke of the sadness and
frustration he had continually felt at society's refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy
and the value of the parents he cherished. The parents he respected were being
denied that same basic human right of respect by the laws of the community.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RESPECT
It is this concern for respect which unites human rights proponents and it is the
denial of respect which underpins discrimination.
In a recent judgment, Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube of the Supreme Court
of Canada captured the essence of this issue when she wrote:
inherent dignity is at the heart of individual rights in a free and democratic
society.. Equality means that our society cannot tolerate legislative distinctions
that treat certain people as second-class citizens, that demean them, that treat them
as less than capable for no good reason, or that otherwise offend fundamental
human dignity.
26
Her comments were made in the landmark 1995 case of Egan v Canada brought by
two men who had been living in a relationship for nearly 50 years by the time it
was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. It was a case under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms which enables federal and provincial legislation to
be challenged as discriminatory on certain grounds.
In Egan, the partners submitted that it was discriminatory to deny them a social
security supplement which would have been paid if they had been an opposite sex
couple. Although they did not succeed in their specific claim, it was the first
unanimous recognition by the highest court in Canada that sexual orientation is a
recognised ground of discrimination under the Charter.
In considering why they did not succeed it is instructive to look to the joint
judgment of four of the five Judges in Egan's case who found against the
plaintiffs.2
26 Egan v Canada (1995) 12 RFL (4th) 201 at 228.
27 La Forest J with whom Lamer CJC, Gonthier and Major JJ concurred.
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DEFINING A FAMILY:
CHILDREN OR INTERDEPENDENCE AND COMMITMENT?
Underlying their Honours' judgment is a view that the legal notion of "family"
should be defined with reference to the functions of this social unit. In this regard,
they elevated the procreation and raising of children to the point of being definitive
of the meaning of "family" and considered the social and legal acceptance and
support of de facto heterosexual families as somewhat of a concession to "the social
reality that increasing numbers choose not to enter a legal marriage". 28 They said
that extending support to unmarried families was warranted in order to avoid the
poverty which is more often faced by sole parents' children and the greater
"burdens" such children often place on society.
29
Whatever one's view of how the state goes about it, society will always have
and, in my view, should always have, an interest in recognising and protecting the
family unit, because it is the natural environment for children to be nurtured and
developed. To hold this view passionately does not, however, justify or logically
lead to the withholding of recognition and protection to relationships which do not
have the raising of children as their raison d'etre. Such relationships are by no
means confined to same-sex relationships.
In my view, it is not procreation that defines a family relationship, it is the
commitment and the financial and emotional interdependence of family members.
To alienate families with these qualities but who are different to the so-called
"traditional" form, is both unnecessary and counter-productive. It is reminiscent of
the legal and social chauvinism that has been largely, but not entirely, dispelled in
respect of so-called illegitimate children.
One of the fundamental misconceptions which plagues the issue is the failure
to understand that heterosexual family life in no way gains stature, security and
respect by the denigration or refusal to aclnowledge same-sex families. The sum
social good is in fact reduced, because when a community refuses to recognise and
protect the genuine commitments made by its members, the state acts against
everybody's interests. This is because it alienates ordinary people whose
28 Egan's case at 223.
29 Egan's case at 224.
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commitments represent an investment in the shared social order and the values
which are promoted by it. 3
0
Madame Justice L'Heureux-Dube put it elegantly when she wrote:
It is possible to be pro-family without rejecting less traditional family forms. It is
not anti-family to support protection for non-traditional families. The traditional
family is not the only family form, and non-traditional family forms may equally
advance true family values. 31
Those who would emphasise the difference between same-sex and heterosexual
families either unwittingly or deliberately cast lesbian and gay men's relationships
as fundamentally and uniformly different and foreign. Such an assumption is
simply insupportable. Social science research and common experience consistently
tell us that diversity is the norm and, to quote one eminent sociologist, Professor
Margrit Eichler: "Overall, the differences among opposite-sex couples and among
same-sex couples are greater than the differences between these two groups". 
32
FAMILY LAW AND DIVERSE FAMILIES
It is precisely this diversity of individuals and families and their circumstances
which presents in family law matters every day. Sexual orientation is no basis upon
which to make assumptions about the quality of an individual's relationships or the
parenting capacities of a person. That is why sexual orientation, in and of itself, has
been held to be an irrelevant matter in disputes about children under the Family
Law Act unless it somehow impinges upon the best interests of the child. 
3
To the extent that such potential effects are relevant, Justice Wootten in the
Supreme Court of New South Wales correctly observed that such matters are
"equally applicable to [the] heterosexual relationships of parents". 34 In saying this,
I am conscious that additional questions are seen to be posed when the courts
evaluate lesbian and gay applicants and their proposals for the care of their
30 Sullivan, A, Virtually Aormal An Argument About Homosexuality, London: Picador, 1995.
31 L'Heureux-Dube J in Canada (Attorney- General) v Mossop [1993] 1 SCR 554 at 634.
32 Nevins Prov J in Re K (1995) 15 RFL (4th) 129 at 142 quoting Dr Margrit Eichler, Professor and
Chair of Sociology at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and the University of Toronto.
33 See the discussion in the Australian case of Re K (1994) FLC 92-461 at 80,774.
34 Jarman v Lloyd (1982) 8 Fain LR 878 at 890, a case prior to the referral of powers in respect of ex
nuptial children by the States.
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children, that are not found in cases where a parent's sexual orientation or partner is
heterosexual.
I am aware that there have been criticisms of the approach taken in some
Family Court cases,35 particularly the first instance 1983 decision L and L,36 which
suggested that a court faced with a homosexual applicant should consider a
"checklist" of factors such as the following:
Whether children raised by homosexual parents may themselves become
homosexual, or whether such an event is likely.
Whether a homosexual parent would show the same love and responsibility as a
heterosexual parent.
Whether homosexual parents will give a balanced sex education to their children
and take a balanced approach to sexual matters.
37
I can appreciate why it is said that these matters begin from an improper footing
because such an a priori list of factors seems to presume that such differences may
be expected when the applicant is a gay man or a lesbian as against a heterosexual
parent. 38 Interestingly, the correctness of the L and L approach has not been the
subject of challenge before a Full Court.
I cannot say what a Full Court would do with such an issue, but I would hope
that the passage of years and the resulting change in community attitudes would be
reflected in the court's consideration of the matter
Related issues did, however, arise in the Canadian adoption case of Re K, 39
which was discussed in Jenni Millbank's paper40 as an illustration of a successful
challenge to statutory definitions. This was a case brought by four lesbian couples
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In each of the couples, one
35 Millbank, J "Lesbian Mothers, Gay Fathers: Sameness and Difference" (1992) 2 Australian Gay
and Lesbian LJ 21; Bateman, M "Lesbians, Gays and Child Custody: An Australian Legal History"
(1992) 1 Australian Gay and Lesbian LJ47.
36 L andL (1983) FLC 91-353.
37 L and L (1983) FLC 91-353 applied in Doyle and Doyle (1992) FLC 92-286.
38 Similar concerns have been raised in respect of Canadian decisions: see Casey, S "Homosexual
Parents and Canadian Child Custody Law" (1994) 32:3 Family and Conciliation Courts Review
379-396; Fowler, J "Homosexual Parents Implications for Custody Cases" (1995) 33:3 Family
and Conciliation Courts Review 361-376.
39 (1995) 15 RFL (4th) 129.
40 '"Which Then Would Be The 'Husband' And Which The 'Wife'?: Contesting 'the Family' in
Court"', Paper presented at the Murdoch University Seminar "Sexual Orientation and the Law", 3
August 1996.
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partner was the birth mother to the child or children under consideration. The
Ontario law permitted an adoption application by "one individual" (without regard
to sexual orientation) or "jointly by two individuals who are spouses of one
another" (married or unmarried). Since the couples did not meet the definition of
"spouse", the practical problem was that the non-birth mother could not apply as an
individual without extinguishing the birth mother's legal connection to the child.
41
In essence, the question which faced Judge Nevins was whether the couples
should be permitted to apply to jointly adopt the children that each was already
parenting. He found that the barrier to joint adoption was discriminatory and, to use
the language of the Charter, not "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society".42 The substantive adoption applications went on to be determined
according to the well-known basis of the "child's best interests" test.
I would particularly draw attention to the examination within Re K of social
science research findings, because Judge Nevins had before him highly regarded
expert evidence in the fields of sociology, 43 psychology,44 and psychiatry, 45 "on
the ability of homosexual persons to parent, individually or as couples". 46 It led his
Honour to find that there is no rational basis for negative stereotypical beliefs about
the mental health and relationship stability of such parents or the psychological
profiles of their children, and I quote:
there is no cogent evidence that homosexual couples are unable to provide the very
type of family environment that the legislation attempts to foster, protect and
encourage, at least to the same extent as "traditional" families parented by
heterosexual couples.
47
I would take a great deal of persuading that the same conclusion does not apply in
Australia. Indeed, one of our longest serving Judges, Justice Lindenmayer, said in a
very early Family Court case on the subject:
41 For a discussion of how courts in the United States have dealt with such cases see: Bates, F "Child
Law and the Homosexual Partner Recent Developments in the United States" (1992) 1 Australian
Gay and Lesbian LJ 21-46; and Connolly, C "An Analysis of Judicial Opinions in Same-Sex
Visitation and Adoption Cases" (1996) 14 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 187-203.
42 Section 1, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
43 Dr Margrit Eichler, Professor and Chair of Sociology at the Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education and the University of Toronto.
44 Dr Rosemary Barnes, former Chief Psychologist at the Women's College Hospital, Toronto.
45 Dr Susan Bradley, Psychiatrist in Chief at the Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto.
46 Re K (1995) 15 RFL (4th) 129 at 141.
47 Re K (1995) 15 RFL (4th) 129 at 161 (emphasis in original).
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A court of law must act upon evidence, not upon assumption or theory... there is
no basis upon which it could be suggested that the Court should judicially notice
that a practising homosexual parent cannot provide as good and healthy an
upbringing for his or her children as a heterosexual one.
4 8
While the Family Law Act itself does not contain the same discriminatory premises
that were challenged in Re K, I accept that any process of decision-making carries
with it the risk that assumption will take the place of evidence. Indeed, a major
educative theme within the court has been the promotion of greater awareness to
issues of gender and race, and the risk of decisions containing unintentional biases
based on stereotypes unsupported by evidence in a particular case.4 9 To date, the
court has not paid direct attention to issues of sexual orientation in these programs
but there is scope for that to occur and, as pointed out in June Williams' paper,'0
stereotyped notions of male homosexuality and lesbianism are interwoven with
concepts of gender roles, and what is thought to be appropriate conformity to them.
One of the most heartening features of the court's gender and Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Awareness programs, to me at least, has been the fact that it
has led to an increased self-questioning by the participants of their approach to
stereotypes and an enthusiasm to confront other areas, such as this one, where
stereotypical thinking abounds.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
By way of conclusion, I would like to take us back to a quote from a speech in
another time on another issue. The words are from an Englishman speaking in 1833
on a matter which, like so many matters seen in a historical perspective, seems a
little self-evident. It is the speech of Thomas Babington Macaulay advocating in
favour of full political equality for Jews in England: Mr Macaulay said of his
opponent:
The plain truth is that my honourable friend is drawn in one direction by his
opinions, and in a directly opposite direction by his excellent heart. He halts
between two opinions. He tries to make a compromise between principles which
48 Brook and Brook (1977) FLC 90-325.
49 See for example, B and R and the Separate Representative (1995) FLC 92-636; McMillan v
Jackson (1995) FLC 92-610; Bartlett and Bartlett (1994) FLC 92-455.
50 See note 3.
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admit of no compromise. He goes a certain way in intolerance. Then he stops,
without being able to give a reason for stopping. But I know the reason. It is his
humanity. Those who formerly dragged the Jew at a horse's tail and singed his
beard with blazing furze-bushes, were much worse men than my honourable
friend; but they were more consistent than he.
51
Australia would do well to have more Honourable Members who could be
described in these terms, as unable to give a reason for their opposition to human
rights because of their "humanity". This does not seem to have been the case here
so far on the subject of sexual orientation.
Hopefully, this seminar will make a difference. I hope it provides the necessary
impetus for the legislators of this State to question any reluctance they may have to
reform the law, and the assumptions which underlie it.
Most of all I hope this seminar leads them to rethink their humanity and to
wonder what it must be like to be denied a pivotal feature of one's humanity for
purposes which, I must say, seem to pander to irrational fear and prejudice.
I wish you well in the pursuit of your goals: recognition and respect for your
human right, and that of your children, to laws that assure and deliver equal and fair
treatment. As a judge, these are my lode stars and I hope that your legislators can
lead as well as navigate towards this future for lesbians, gay men and their families.
51 Sullivan, op cit p.94.
The Legal Recognition of
Relationships between
Couples of the Same Sex:
A New Zealand Perspective1
Anita Jowitt
LLB(Hons)
Now that New Zealand has guaranteed freedom from discrimination on the grounds
of sexual orientation, one is able to argue convincingly that legislative change must
occur so that same-sex couples can be recognised. This article discusses the rights-
based argument as to why the current position of the law in respect of same-sex
couples is untenable before turning to consider what the best option for law reform
might be.2
RIGHTS-BASED CHANGE
The current invisibility of same-sex couples appears to be justified on the ground
that we live in a democracy in which the will of the majority, which does not
endorse same-sex relationships, rules. This justification demonstrates a fundamental
misunderstanding of New Zealand's political and legal system. Our democratic
1 A revised and shortened version of a paper submitted for the 1994 Auckland Lesbian and Gay
Lawyers Group Prize.
2 Although alternative family forms may also require legal recognition, this article focuses
exclusively upon the recognition of couples.
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system has chosen to protect various fundamental human rights which cannot be
curtailed at the mere whim of the majority. 3
Is a Protected Human Right being Curtailed by Lack of Recognition?
Following the passing of the Human Rights Act in 1993, freedom from
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is clearly a protected human
right. 4 The legal invisibility of same-sex couples breaches this right because many
legal benefits and protections which are available to heterosexual couples are
inaccessible to their same-sex counterparts simply because of a different sexual
orientation.
The response that no discrimination is occurring because people are not being
denied the opportunity to form relationships misses the point somewhat. The
discriminatory behaviour highlighted is not in the area of forming relationships but
in the area of legally recognising them.
The counterclaim that anyone can access these legal benefits if only they enter
a relationship with someone of the opposite sex is also inadequate. Only a
heterosexual choice of partner will be rewarded with legal recognition. A
homosexual choice is not similarly rewarded. This is discriminatory.
Can the Non-recognition of Same-sex Couples be Demonstrably
Justified as a "Reasonable Limit "?
Protected rights are not absolute but "may be subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society". 5 The New Zealand Court of Appeal has provided some guidance to
interpretation of this phrase, stating that rights "may be modified in the public
interest to take account of the rights of others and of the interests of the whole
community". 6 It appears that the entire issue will be treated as a balancing act. The
legitimate public interest, arising out of the potential for empirically demonstrable
impingements on other citizens' rights if the freedom in question is protected, will
3 The rights protected are to be found in the ANew Zealand Bill of/Rights Act 1990, the Human Rights
Act 1993 and various international treaties and covenants that New Zealand has ratified.
4 Section 21 (1)(m).
5 Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill ot/Rights Act 1990.
6 AoortvMOT[1990-92] 1 NZBORR 97 at 159.
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be weighed against the detriment to society caused by curtailing a fundamental
freedom.
The alleged harms that most usually are suggested would arise if recognition
were to occur are that:
* society will disintegrate,
* Christianity will be undermined,
* youth will be damaged or corrupted,
* the natural purpose of sex (procreation) will be undermined,
* AIDS will be spread, and/or
* the essential heterosexual nature of marriage will be destroyed.
However, these concerns are shown to be factually inaccurate or otherwise
inadequate on closer examination.
Accepting that to recognise same-sex couples will cause significant alterations
to the current ordering of society, the argument that harm will be caused because
society will disintegrate presupposes that the society is worthy of being preserved.
However, to alter or destroy a society may be a cogent desire. It must first be
shown that any restrictions the existing society imposes are not illegitimate
curtailments on freedom before alteration to the status quo can justify curtailing
protected human rights.
The suggestion that because New Zealand is a predominantly Christian society
it is more important to maintain Christian standards than to recognise protected
human rights has several flaws. Claims of religious homogeneity in New Zealand8
or a united Christian view on homosexuality 9 are false. More importantly, to
impose "Christian standards" on society impinges on citizens' right to freedom of
religion by effectively creating a de facto State religion.10 Further, New Zealand
courts distinguish law and religion. Breaking an ecclesiastical duty is not "a
violation of any duty. . . cognisable by a Court of law"." Rather, religious rules
must be otherwise adopted by the legal system before breaking them will cause a
7 Professor Hart's reference to Nazi Germany demonstrates this point in Law Liberty and Morality,
London: OUP, 1963, p 38.
8 See the 1991 census statistics, in Evans, J (ed), New Zealand Qficial Yearbook 1994, New
Zealand: Statistics New Zealand, 1994.
9 Reference to some homosexual-supportive Christian organisations in New Zealand can be found in
Brommell, Donnelley, Hein & Neave, Love Unbounded, Auckland: Colcom Press, 1992).
10 Section 13 of the New Zealand Bill o'Rights Act 1990.
11 Baldwin v Pascoe 9 LRNZ 759 at 772.
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cognisable legal harm. Offending against religious beliefs is not therefore
sufficiently harmful to justify legal discrimination.
Claims that harm to children will occur because they "may be exposed or
introduced to ways of life which... may lead to a severance from normal society,
to psychological stress and unhappiness and possibly even to physical experience,
which may scar them for life" 12are simply not backed up by empirical evidence.
Researchers have found that the parents' lifestyle does not influence a child's
choice of friends or whether they bring these friends home. Nor are children raised
in a same-sex family more likely to become homosexual. Stigmatisation amongst
peers is rare and no more damaging than other forms of teasing. 13As to fears of
"physical experiences", it is heterosexuals who are more likely to molest children. 14
Allegations of corruption simply because more young people may come out in
a less homophobic environment are invalid. Establishing corruption requires
empirically demonstrable evidence that homosexual practices are harmful, not
merely that the number of homosexuals will increase.
As to undermining the "natural (procreative) purpose" of sex, undoubtedly
fairly harmful effects would ensue if procreation ceased altogether. However, it is
ridiculous to seriously contend that procreative sex will be abandoned if same-sex
couples are recognised. The argument has two other major flaws. First, the primary
purpose of relationships is not necessarily to have "sex" so, regardless of what the
natural purpose of sex is, it is fairly irrelevant to the issue of whether relationships
should be recognised. Secondly, it is naive to believe that the only reason that
people indulge in sex is for procreative purposes. Its "natural purpose" is thus
unclear.
The fear that AIDS will be spread if same-sex couples are recognised is based
upon ignorance. AIDS is caused by a non-discriminating virus. AIDS is
everybody's business. Ignoring the existence of homosexuals will not make it go
away. No other disease has the effect of preventing a class in society who are
statistically more likely to become infected from having their relationships
recognised. AIDS should be no different. Indeed, as HIV may be less likely to be
12 Lord Wilberforce in Re D [1977] 1 All ER 145 at 153.
13 Research into all these areas is reported in Talbot, D, Homosexual Women and Men in Australia
and New Zealand, Western Australia: Gay Counselling Service, 1985, p 40.
14 New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board, Discrimination and Homosexuality Summary,
New South Wales: West, D Government Printer, 1982.
